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 Artificial intelligence (AI) is a quickly advancing technology that has the potential to 
displace a great deal of workers.  Unlike past automation-based technologies, I find that high 
skilled labor is more impacted by AI than lower skilled labor.  In order to analyze the impact that 
AI will have on the labor market, I utilize a fixed effects model for a historical case of 
automation’s impact on employment and a fitted parameter methodology to analyze the careers 
most and least exposed to artificial intelligence.  My results suggest that an increase in exposure 
to automation technologies by one percentile leads to a .049% decrease in industry-occupation 
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I. Introduction and Motivation 
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 Throughout modern economic history, automation technologies have almost strictly been 
substitutes for low skilled labor and complements to high skilled labor; however, as human 
innovation and technological advancements have progressed, there now exists a technology that 
has the potential to displace high skilled labor.  Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to technologies 
that utilize machine learning, in which computers analyze data using algorithms, establish 
statistical patterns, and use these patterns to make decisions.  Differing from past technology, AI 
completes tasks with no human instruction (outside of the development of AI itself), and atop 
this fact, AI achieves these tasks with superhuman performance (Webb, 2020).  As such, 
artificial intelligence is causing a great deal of anxiety over the future of human work and 
employment.  The aim of this paper is to analyze the potential impact that artificial intelligence 
will have on employment (by industry and occupation).   
 The impact of automation on the labor market has been a concern for economists since 
the organization of modern work arose.  The motivation for a plethora of economic papers on 
automation, including this one, comes from John Maynard Keynes’s idea of technological 
unemployment, which is “unemployment due to our discovery of means of economising the use 
of labour outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour” (Keynes, 1930).  When 
technological advancements significantly outpace new job creation, there is a significant 
disconnect between the amount of available jobs and the amount of individuals in the labor force.  
Changes in the labor market are slow to occur for a multitude of reasons: investing in human 
capital takes a great deal of time and effort, new industries are slow to develop, occupations 
remaining may not be suitable for certain demographics, etc.  However, historically these 
changes do occur over time, and standards of living are improved for virtually everyone in the 
economy.  This evolution in the labor market was understood and predictable.  Artificial 
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intelligence has the potential to change technological expectations; therefore, the implications of 
AI on employment and demographic equality and inequality ought to be analyzed. 
 Currently, there exists a “false dichotomy” in the debate on artificial intelligence and its 
implications on the labor market: AI means the end of human work versus AI, regardless of its 
capabilities, will contribute to an increase in labor demand like automation technologies have 
always done in the past (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018).  Those who are more pessimistic have 
an understandable viewpoint.  Artificial intelligence is capable and will advance to be more 
capable of doing something that was previously exclusive to the human aspect of the labor 
market: the ability to learn, adapt, and make decisions.  Atop this, because artificial intelligence 
tends to target high skilled labor that requires more of an investment in human capital (Webb, 
2020), the previous “cure” of investing in more human capital will not be nearly as effective as it 
was in the past.  However, the past normally and somewhat accurately, tends to provide insight 
into what the future holds.  This paper will analyze historical technological forms of automation 
(robots and software) on employment and use these parameters to estimate the potential impact 





II. Literature Review 
 
 Artificial intelligence is cutting edge technology and its potential impact on the future of 
human work is just being realized.  As such, the economic literature on artificial intelligence is in 
the early phases and relatively scarce.  However, the study of general automation of work and its 
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impact on labor is extensive.  Publications of this sort will assist in guiding the historical analysis 
necessary to examine artificial intelligence, and any paper that analyzes artificial intelligence 
first examines historical cases.  The most common first step among existing literature is defining 
and providing a numerical score for some sort of a “technology” variable.  This entails matching 
common tasks found in various occupations to tasks that patented technologies are capable of 
performing.  Patented technology is defined as any and all products, processes, and methods 
registered with the US Patent Office.  Multiple sources (Brynjolfsson, Mitchell, and Rock, 2018; 
Frey and Osborne, 2013; Webb, 2020) utilize data from O*NET, which is a database provided by 
the US Department of Labor that explains the tasks performed in occupations in the United 
States.  If a patented technology has the capability to perform a task within an occupation, then 
its technology score increases.  However, though the goal is the same, there are different 
methodologies in establishing these scores.  Frey and Osborne utilize a Gaussian process 
classifier in order to establish a “probability of computerisation” for 702 detailed occupations.  
Brynjolfsson, Mitchell, and Rock construct a variable entitled the “suitability for machine 
learning” or SML, which takes 964 occupations in the economy and matches them to 18,156 
specific tasks at the occupation level.  The authors then use a rubric developed in a past paper 
written by Brynjolfsson to determine the SML. Because all occupations have a multitude of 
different tasks, virtually no occupation has tasks that are all ‘SML’.  Similarly, Webb (2020) 
develops a technological exposure score for occupations collected through the American 
Community Survey.  Task descriptions from O*NET are cross referenced with public patent 
data, which is gathered through Google Patents.  Verb-noun pairs from each dataset are matched 
with the use of WordNet, a program commonly used in natural language processing for 
literature. Based on the frequency of verb-noun pairs, Webb establishes a numerical exposure 
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score and exposure percentile for each occupation.  Upon the creation of this variable, all of 
these authors are able to analyze and run models on technology’s (and more particularly artificial 
intelligence) impact on the labor market.  Various other papers, including Bessen, et. al, 2019 
and Graetz and Michaels, 2018, examine technology’s impact differently.  In Automatic Reaction 
– What Happens to Workers at Firms that Automate?, the authors examine firm level data after 
the introduction of  automation technology, while in Robots at Work, the authors utilize data 
from the International Federation of Robotics.  Despite having different focuses, these papers 
share a similar theme: to examine the impact of modern automation on the labor market. 
 Like with any economic analysis of future trends, there are limitations.  Predicting and 
even explaining the impact of technology is no easy feat.  Virtually any author of empirical 
papers on automation based technologies discuss the limitations of their research in their 
conclusion section.  However, compelling results that are logically sound are possible and given 
in the existing literature.  There are variations in the results ranging from a conclusion that areas 
in which automation is a factor, incumbent workers are more likely to be displaced (Bessen, et. 
al, 2019) to an increase in the use of industrial robots and other forms of technology contribute to 
a significant increase in labor productivity (Graetz and Michaels, 2018).  Papers that look 
exclusively at AI or machine learning find that these forms of automation have the potential to 
displace highly educated, high skilled labor, which is a historical first (Brynjolfsson, Mitchell, 
and Rock, 2018; Webb, 2020).  Frey and Osborne have more pessimistic results, which suggest 
that 47% of total employment in the United States is considered at “high risk,” meaning that 
these jobs could potentially be fully automated within the next two decades.  Regardless, all of 
these results suggest that the current technological boom should be studied and understood. 
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 In The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on the Labor Market, Michael Webb examines the 
impact of AI further by running a simulation to predict the future of income inequality.  He finds 
that AI has the potential to decrease income inequality by displacing high skilled workers who 
tend to be paid more.  His paper also examines various descriptive statistics of demographics, 
including age, gender, education, and wage percentile.  However, the authors of the existing 
literature do not predict the displacement effect on employment as Webb did for two historical 
cases.  As such, this paper will explore the potential changes in employment for artificial 
intelligence explicitly. 
 
III. Theoretical Model  
 
 The theoretical model for this paper is guided by the historical tendency for capital or 
technology to substitute for labor when it performs the same or comparable tasks better than its 
human counterpart.  In the past, automation in all its forms, whether advanced farming 
equipment of the Industrial Revolution or robots that have taken over the manufacturing 
industry, initially reduced the demand for labor and put downward pressure on wages.  Labor 
and wage reduction is counteracted by a productivity effect, which leads to cost savings, which 
leads to an increase in the labor demand for occupations not impacted by AI (Acemoglu and 
Restrepo, 2018).  However, artificial intelligence can have an ambiguous effect on labor because 
there may or may not be a mismatch of skills between remaining occupations and displaced high 
skilled workers.  Another potential problem arises with the rate at which artificial intelligence is 
being introduced and developed.  This exorbitant rate can further the divide between displacing 
workers and the counter effect discussed above.  The employment and wage reduction 
(displacement effect) does not necessarily fade in a timely fashion: the negative impact from the 
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introduction of robots and software are still measurable and significant after 10 years (Webb, 
2020).  As such, the detrimental aspects of artificial intelligence will more than likely be 
observable well into the future; therefore, examining and predicting the severity of the impact on 
employment is necessary.   
 In the publication Artificial Intelligence: The Ambiguous Labor Market Impact of 
Automating Prediction, Argawal, et al. (2019) layout theoretical models and scrutinize all 
necessary economic intuition for analyzing artificial intelligence and the labor market.  Artificial 
intelligence causes displacement anxiety for good reason: computers have advanced at an 
alarming rate over the past decade and their use for economically valuable tasks is developing 
just as quickly.  Currently, AI is more than sufficient in making predictions, which are a major 
component of decision making.  AI performed predictions tasks are perfect substitutes to human 
performed prediction tasks and are perfect complements to decision tasks.  AI will directly 
disrupt prediction task based jobs and may indirectly impact decision task based jobs by 
changing the relative returns of labor versus capital (Argaway, et al., 2019).  The authors 
continue to suggest that occupations that were not previously thought of as prediction based will 
be transformed and reconfigured in order to minimize costs for firms.  Regardless of the 
occupation, the authors suggest thinking of occupations in terms of prediction and decision tasks, 
due to the substitutionary and complementary relationship.  Similarly to all historical cases of 
automation displacing workers, artificial intelligence will likely “lead to increases in labor tasks 
upstream or downstream” (Argaway, et al., 2019).  Chin et al. (2005) found this to be the case 
during the Second Industrial Revolution, as the automation in the sailing and shipping industry 
initially decreased demand for sailors.  This was counteracted by the creation of a new demand 
for engineers aboard ships and an increase in productivity for merchants.  Because of the cyclical 
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nature of the economy and the similarities between past technology and artificial intelligence, 
history will provide insight on the future.  This leads to the hypothesis for this paper that higher 
exposure to technology (and artificial intelligence specifically) will lead to a decrease in 
industry-occupational employment.  In other words, after substitutionary technology is 
introduced in an industry-occupation the relative number of individuals within that industry-
occupation will decrease, as shown through a decrease in the industry-occupation’s share of the 
labor market. 
 
IV. Data and Empirical Methodology 
 
 My primary source of data comes from the American Community Survey.  I use 
individuals’ race, gender, level of education, age, and income as control variables.  I restrict 
these controls to 2010.  These (excluding age and income, which are quantitative) are first 
constructed as dummy variables.  Race is divided by white, African American, and other; levels 
of education is measured by Low Education (less than high school) Medium Education (diploma 
or GED, some college) and High Education (Bachelor’s degree or Higher).  I then utilize the 
means procedure to find the demographic makeup of each industry-occupation cell.  My 
occupation and industry variables are standardized using titles and descriptions from 1990.  
Using David Dorn’s offshorability by occ1990 variable, I control for global occupational 
relocation. 
 In order to create my employment variable, I follow the literature and first establish an 
industry-occupation variable, in which the first three digits are the industry (1990 basis) code and 
the last three digits are the occupation (1990 basis) code.  Rather than strictly looking at 
occupations, the industry-occupation provides a deeper level of insight into occupations that span 
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across multiple industries (and allow for many more observations).  I then utilized the DHS 
method which was created by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh in 1996.  This effectively creates 
an “arc percentage” or percent change related to the midpoint and calculates the change in share 
of employment.  I do this by finding each industry-occupation’s change in share of the labor 
market from 1980 to 2010 and dividing by an average of the two years.   The DHS percent 
change between 1980 and 2010 (which I multiply by 100 so that all parameter estimates make 
more sense)  is my dependent variable.   
 The proxy variable for technology comes from Michael Webb (2020).  Each occupation 
with a 1990 basis from the ACS data is given an exposure score to various types of technology 
including software and artificial intelligence.  Webb assigns this score by analyzing the text of 
task descriptions found in patents (pulled from Google Patents) and matching that to that of task 
description for each occupation (pulled from O*NET).  By matching verb-noun pairs found in 
both patents and job descriptions, Webb is able to quantify the extent to which each job may be 
automated.  It is important to note that the exposure score to AI does not describe the extent to 
which occupations have already been automated, but how these tasks have the potential to be 
automated, while the exposure score to software gives a better insight into how careers have 
already been automated.  Furthermore, this exposure score is then measured as a percentile in 
order to make comparisons between occupations more simple.  In order to assign an exposure 
score percentile to each individual in the American Community Survey data, I merge the datasets 
by the occupation code present in both datasets.  I utilize the exposure score to software as my 
main independent variable in empirical methods and the exposure score to artificial intelligence 
for the fitted parameter analysis of the industry-occupations most and least exposed to artificial 
intelligence.  Michael Webb also utilized the fitted parameter methodology. The Digital 
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Revolution of the 1990s contributed to similar societal anxieties over employment as the AI 
revolution of today is doing, making software a valid benchmark in analyzing AI.  
 In order to gain initial results, I use a simple ordinary least squares regression, and later 
run the same model controlled for occupational fixed effect. In the following model, i represents 
the occupation: 
DHSPctChangeᵢ = 𝛽₀ + 𝛽₁ pct_softwareᵢ + 𝛽₂ task_offshorabilityᵢ + 𝛽₃ Femaleᵢ +  
 𝛽₄ African_Americanᵢ + 𝛽₅ Other_Raceᵢ + 𝛽₆ Ageᵢ + 𝛽₇ Medium_Educationᵢ +  
𝛽₈ High_Educationᵢ + 𝛽₉ LogIncomeᵢ + εᵢ 
The independent variable of interest is pct_software, which ranks each industry-
occupation’s exposure to software based technologies on a percentile level.  Using the reasoning 
that technology is a substitute for labor, I expect that this coefficient will be negative.  I expect a 
similar phenomena to occur for the task_offshorabilty variable, as occupations that are more 
likely to be sent to other countries will lose share of the domestic labor market. 
 My expectations for the demographic control variables are mainly rooted in trends and 
generalizations.  The female coefficient will likely be positive because of an increase in females 
in the labor market.  African American labor force participants tend to be in lower skilled 
occupations, and as such I predict that the African_American variable will have a negative 
coefficient.  The Other_Race variable may be a little more ambiguous, as individuals of other 
races are more heterogeneous with both high and low skilled individuals.  As such, I expect the 
other race variable to be slightly positive, albeit closer to zero. The Age variable will likely be 
negative due to older people being more exposed to technology than younger people.  Human 
capital attainment has a positive relationship with employment, so I expect Medium and High 
levels of education to have a positive coefficient.  I expect LogIncome, which is a log measure of 
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individuals’ yearly earnings, to be positive because of a trend of the labor market moving 
towards higher wages. 
V. Descriptive Results 
 
 Descriptive statistics are crucial for understanding who will be most impacted by the 
artificial intelligence movement and increasing levels of automation.  To measure this, I 
correlated occupational demographics to Exposure to AI.  Because I restricted the level of 
education down to three broad categories, I rather looked at the IPUMS detailed education level 
for more observations in this correlation.  A higher x-value corresponds to a higher level of 
education.  For the age correlation, I found the average level of exposure for each age, such that 
there is one observation for each year old (18-65) age group.  My results fell in line with existing 
literature:  
Figure 1: Average exposure by level of education (left) & Average exposure by age (right) 
 
 
Unlike past trends, one gains more exposure to this form of automation technology as they invest 
more into human capital. In other words, higher educated people are more likely to work with (or 
be substituted) by artificial intelligence.  The correlation coefficient of .86 suggests a strong 
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relationship between education and AI exposure.  Generally speaking, older people are more 
likely to be exposed to AI than those first entering the labor market.  This relationship has a great 
deal of importance: older workers are more “immobile,” both geographically and occupationally, 
and because they have fewer years left in the labor market, retraining is less appealing to them 
(Webb, 2020).  The relationship between gender and exposure to AI was not as clear (or as 
visually appealing) as the other two demographics.  Females are less likely to be exposed to AI, 
with a relatively weak correlation coefficient of -.26.  An exhaustive list of more descriptive 
statistics can be found in Tables 1 & 2 of the Appendix. 
 
VI. Empirical Results 
 
i. Historical Analysis (Software) 
In order to examine whether or not technological exposure has a negative relationship 
with employment, I utilized both an Ordinary Least Squares and a one-way fixed effects model.   
Within the OLS model (See model 2 in Table 3), my independent variable of interest 
(pct_software) is negative and significant, just as I hypothesized.  The results suggest that an 
increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile in technological exposure results in a 5.5% decrease 
in industry-occupation share in the labor market, all other things being equal.  Though this 
percentage may seem small, the labor market was over 150 million people in 2010, making every 
hundredth of a percent have a profound impact.  Although this is the historical technological 
impact on employment, with the fitted parameter methodology, this has a great deal of impact for 
the future of the labor market as the artificial intelligence movement continues.  The task 
offshorability parameter estimate is negative, as expected.  If tasks in a particular occupation 
have a high tendency to be relocated to other countries, then these occupations would be 
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expected to have a lesser share of the labor market domestically.  As for the control / 
demographic results, education parameters became increasingly more positive at each level.  
From 1980 to 2010, careers became more and more dependent on higher levels of human capital 
attainment which suggests that those who achieved a high school diploma or higher would see 
their occupation’s share of the labor market increase.  Similarly, the female coefficient is positive 
such that an increase of 1 % in the female ratio of each industry-occupation results in a .19 % 
increase in an industry-occupation’s share of the labor market.  This is likely due to the female 
labor force participation rate increasing from 1980 to 2010 as well as a high female participation 
rate in service based industries, which are not as impacted by technology.  The coefficient for 
age is negative as expected, with an increase in average age by 1 year leading to a .97 % 
decrease in industry-occupation’s share of the labor market.  This is likely due to the aging labor 
market: the Baby Boomer generation (which is larger than other generations) reached retirement 
age by 2010, and as such industry-occupation’s with an older average age shrank.  In terms of 
race, industry-occupations with a higher percentage of African American individuals saw their 
share of the labor market actually increase, which was opposite of what was expected.  For every 
additional percentage of African American individuals, the industry-occupation’s share of the 
labor market increases by .095%, and for every additional percentage of other races, the 
industry-occupation’s share of the labor market increases by .1319%.   
With 19,836 industry-occupations as observations, all variables except for African 
American were statistically significant beyond the 99 percent level.  The model has a weak 
adjusted r-squared value of .0559 which suggests this model can only explain about 5% of the 
variation.  However, this likely stems from the fact that this is a simple OLS without controlling 
for endogeneity or any other problems. 
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The F-Value of 23.11 (Model 4 in Table 3) suggests that I can reject the null hypothesis 
of no fixed effects, thus indicating that a fixed effects model is more suited for my research 
question than an OLS.  After controlling for occupation fixed effects, the coefficient for 
technological exposure remains robust; however, it weakens slightly, such that an increase from 
the 25th to the 75th percentile in technological exposure results in a 2.45% decrease in industry-
occupation share in the labor market.  This coefficient also became slightly less statistically 
significant, dropping from the 99% level to 95% level.  Most other coefficients remain similar to 
those in the OLS.  The biggest difference comes from the log of yearly income variable, as it was 
negative and significant in the OLS model but positive and significant in the fixed effects, such 
that a one percent increase in yearly income leads to a .0466% increase in labor market share by 
industry-occupation. 
The explanatory power of the fixed effects model is much greater than that of the OLS 
model, with an adjusted r-squared value of .2413.  This is comparable to the adjusted r-squared 
that Michael Webb (2020) found with his fixed effects model.  When the fixed effects 
methodology is implemented, the chance of omitted variable bias is greatly reduced and validity 
is added to the results.   
     ii. Prediction Analysis (AI) 
 Following the literature, I use fitted parameters in order to predict the future of artificial 
intelligence's impact on employment.  This Digital Revolution is often considered the Third 
Industrial Revolution and shares a great deal of similarities with the technological advancements 
of today, which is often referred to as the Fourth Industrial Revolution.  Within the later part of 
the twentieth century, technology became a staple of everyday life.  The rise of the internet and 
personal computers, average individuals were able to utilize relatively advanced technology in 
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their homes.  However, in the workplace, digitization and software caused a great deal of socio-
economic anxieties over the future of work (and as my results suggest, these anxieties were valid 
since software exposure did decrease share of employment).  Political leaders and innovators of 
AI are voicing some of the same concerns today.  Since the Digital Revolution of the late 
twentieth century can be used as a benchmark, I can utilize the parameters found in model 4, but 
substitute my exposure percentile for software with the exposure score for artificial intelligence.  
This requires me to make the strong assumption that software will have the same impact as AI, 
just on different occupations. Utilizing the fitted parameters I found the predicted impact for the 
five industry-occupations most and least exposed to Artificial Intelligence: 
Figure 2: Examining the most and least exposed industry-occupations. Most exposed have an 
exposure percentile of 100 and least exposed have an exposure percentile of 1. 
Prediction for Artificial Intelligence 
Fitted Parameters 








DHS Δ  
Clinical Laboratory Technicians 
(Health Services) 
8.97  Funeral Directors 









-3.84 Mail Carriers 
(US Postal Service) 
-3.38 
Power Plant Operators 
(Electric Light and Power) 
-4.26 Subject Instructors 




-1.05 Art/Entertainment Performers 
(Misc. Personal Services) 
-5.07 
Notes: Predicted change in DHS is calculated using industry-occupation specific demographics and the 
parameters found in the detailed Fixed Effect Model (1).   
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The most exposed industry-occupations are all within the 100th percentile for exposure to 
artificial intelligence whilst the least exposed industry-occupations are within the 1st percentile.  
Because the historical analysis examined a change over 30 years, the numbers above estimate the 
change from 2010 to 2040.  There are some pretty clear trends, with the highly exposed careers 
mainly losing labor market share.  However, there are quite a few discrepancies, which come as 
a result of technological exposure not having the only role in determining changes in 
employment.  Most notably, chemical engineers and clinical technicians are highly exposed to 
AI, but the fields are expected to grow quite significantly.  An overwhelming majority of 
individuals in these occupations have medium or high levels of education.  Similarly, industry-
occupations that are minimally exposed and have lower average levels of education, such as art 
performers and food workers, actually decrease in their share of the labor market.  This suggests 
that gains from higher levels of human capital investment can outweigh the losses that come 
from being exposed to automation (and vice versa).  In a broader sense, the highest amounts of 
investment in education may offer job security against automation.  There exists a plethora of 
other variables that play a role in determining the shape of the labor market, many of which are 
impossible to capture manually.  However, when controlling for fixed effects between 
occupations, exposure to technology is most definitely influential in how industry-occupations 
change over time. 
  
VII. Conclusions and Limitations 
 
Higher technological exposure was shown to historically decrease occupational labor 
market share / employment, which confirms my hypothesis.  I make rather strong assumptions by 
utilizing the fitted parameter methodology, and truthfully, I do not believe AI and software will 
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have the same exact economic impact.  Though my research finds that the impact of an artificial 
intelligence revolution may not be as extreme as others suggest, there are a great deal of policy 
and societal implications.  Firstly, individuals (especially those entering college and the labor 
force) should be aware of the potential their field has for being automated.  This will 
undoubtedly impact the types of degrees college students obtain as AI becomes more and more 
prevalent in the workforce.  Secondly, state and national governments should be aware of the 
potential for structural unemployment and the welfare safety nets for these individuals. 
Industry leaders and government leaders alike have warned about the future of artificial 
intelligence.  Elon Musk, founder of SpaceX and Tesla, often warns about what the future of AI 
has in store.  Because of his familiarity with the powerful technology, he has stated that he 
believes AI is a “fundamental threat to the existence of human civilization,” and as such 
regulation from the government should be “proactive rather than reactive.”  Similarly, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin says that the nation that leads in AI “will be the ruler of the world.”  
These public statements contribute to societal anxieties, but also suggest that AI holds more 
potential (economically) than any past technologies.   
 Because artificial intelligence is continuously advancing and has only recently started 
being used to perform humanlike tasks, the general public may not see the direct impacts for 
upwards of 5 or so years.  Measuring phenomena that have not yet occured is difficult because 
data simply does not exist, which is why I utilized past data to provide an insight into the future.  
However, as the above literature suggests, artificial intelligence may not necessarily lead to some 
of the same economic consequences as software.  The reality that stems from artificial 
intelligence may be much more ambiguous than my model suggests.  A displacement effect may 
occur much faster than in previous cases as software requires constant human instruction, while 
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artificial intelligence does not.  However, artificial intelligence also requires a great deal of 
investing in complementary capital (Webb, 2020), which may slow down a possible 
displacement effect.  Because of the uncertainty surrounding the future of artificial intelligence, 
future econometric analysis is needed as the data applicable to AI becomes available.    
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Variable Description Mean Source 
task_offshorability Score for outsourcing by OCC1990 .431 David Dorn 
pct_ai Exposure percentile to AI by OCC1990 54.402 Michael Webb 
pct_software Exposure percentile to software by OCC1990 52.75 Michael Webb 
Female Average percentage of women across industry-
occupations (2010 basis) 
.399 ACS 
White Average percentage of white individuals across 
industry-occupations (2010 basis) 
.802 ACS 
African_American Average percentage of African American 
individuals across industry-occupations (2010 
basis) 
.09 ACS 
Other_Race Average percentage of individuals of a different 
race across industry-occupations (2010 basis) 
.108 ACS 
Low_Education Average percentage of individuals with a low 
level of education across industry-occupations 
(2010 basis) 
.087 ACS 
Medium_Education Average percentage of individuals with a 
medium level of education across industry-
occupations (2010 basis) 
.63 ACS 
High_Education Average percentage of individuals with a high 
level of education across industry-occupations 
.283 ACS 
DHS Average arc percentage change in share of the 
labor market across industry-occupations times 
100 
.705 ACS 
LogIncome Average log of annual income ($) across 






Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
N = 19,836 
Variable DHS pct_software pct_ai task_offshorability 

















































































Technology & Employment 
Dependent Variable: DHSPctChange x 100 
 Model 











































































Adj. R-Squared .0057 .0559 .0465 .2413 .2384 
F-Value 115.19 131.47 194.33 23.11 23.86 
# of Observations 19,836 19,836 19,836 19,836 19,836 
Notes: Each observation is an industry-occupation cell.  The dependent variable is 100x the DHS change for each 
industry-occupation from 1980 to 2010.  Standard errors are shown parenthetically below each estimator.  Statistical 
significance is demonstrated as * (90%), ** (95%), and *** (99%).  Fixed Effects Models are one way fixed by 









if sex = 2 then Female = 1; 
   else Female =0; 
  
if raced = 100 then White = 1; 
   else White= 0; 
if raced = 200 then African_American= 1; 
   else African_American = 0; 
if 110 le raced le 150 then delete; 
if 210 le raced le 996 then Other_Race=1; 
   else Other_Race = 0; 
  
if 000 le EducD le 061 then Less_than_HS = 1; 
   else Less_than_HS = 0; 
if 062 le EducD le 064 then Diploma_or_GED = 1; 
   else Diploma_or_GED = 0; 
if 065 le EducD le 100 then Some_College = 1; 
   else Some_College = 0; 
if EducD = 101 then Bachelors = 1; 
   else Bachelors = 0; 
if 110 le EducD le 116 then Masters_Plus = 1; 
   else Masters_Plus = 0; 
if educd = 999 then delete; 
  
if 000 le EducD le 061 then Low_Education =1; 
   else Low_Education = 0; 
if 062 le EducD le 100 then Medium_Education = 1; 
   else Medium_Education = 0; 
if 101 le EducD le 116 then High_Education = 1; 
   else High_Education= 0; 
  
if empstat = 1 then Employed = 1; 
   else Employed = 0; 
if empstat = 2 then Unemployed = 1; 
   else Unemployed = 0; 
if empstat = 3 then delete; 
  
if occ1990 = . then delete; 
if ind1990 = . then delete; 
if incwage = . then delete; 
if incwage = 0 then delete; 
  
industry= IND1990 *1000; 
indocc = industry + occ1990; 
Income = incwage / 52; 





   by occ1990; 
   run; 
  
libname Exp "D:\Senior_Project\Exp"; 
filename ai "D:\Senior_Project\Exp\Exposure.csv"; 
  
proc sort data = exp.ai; 
   by occ1990; 
   run; 
proc import Datafile = "D:\Senior_Project\Offshore\Offshore.dta" out = 
offshoring REPLACE; 
   run; 
proc sort data = work.offshoring; 
   by occ1990dd; 
   run; 
data offshoring2; 
   set work.offshoring; 
   rename occ1990dd = occ1990; 
   run; 
  
data IPUMS.Good; 
   merge IPUMS.dum exp.ai work.offshoring2; 
   by occ1990; 
   run; 
  
data IPUMS.intermediate; 
   set IPUMS.Good; 
   run; 
proc sort nodupkey; 
   by indocc; 
   run; 
  
data indoccpct2010;         /*creating employment variable for 2010*/ 
   merge IPUMS.Good; 
   by OCC1990; 
   if pct_software = . then delete; 
   if year = 2010 then _2010 = 1; 
         else delete; 
   run; 
  
proc freq; 
   tables indocc*(_2010) / out=want outpct; 
   run; 
  
data TwentyTen; 
   set work.want; 
   Rename PCT_COL = Pct2010; 
   run; 
  
data occpct1980; 
   merge IPUMS.dum exp.ai;    /*creating employment variable for 1980*/ 
   by OCC1990; 
   if pct_software = . then delete; 
   if year = 1980 then _1980 = 1; 
         else delete; 




   tables indocc*(_1980) / out=please outpct; 
   run; 
  
data NineteenEighty; 
   set work.please;                       
   Rename PCT_COL = Pct1980; 
   run; 
  
data pctmerge; 
   merge work.TwentyTen work.NineteenEighty;             
   by indocc;/*creating main independent variable (change in employment)*/ 
   if Pct2010 = . then delete; 
   if Pct1980 = . then delete; 
   PctChange= Pct2010 - Pct1980; 
   DHSPctChange = (Pct2010-Pct1980)/((Pct2010+Pct1980)/2); 
   PctChangeOCC= (Pct2010 - PctChange) / Pct2010; 
   run; 
  
data IPUMS.control; 
   set IPUMS.Good; 
   if year = 2010 then _2010=1; 
         else delete; 
   run; 
proc sort; 
   by indocc; 
   run; 
proc means noprint; 
   by indocc; 
var Female age White African_American Other_Race Less_than_HS 
Diploma_or_GED Some_College Bachelors Masters_Plus LogIncome 
Low_education Medium_Education High_Education; 
output out = control mean(Female age White African_American Other_Race 
Less_Than_HS Diploma_or_GED Some_College Bachelors Masters_plus 
LogIncome Low_education Medium_Education High_Education)= 
Avg_Female Avg_age Avg_White Avg_African_American 
         Avg_Other_Race Avg_Less_than_HS Avg_Diploma_or_GED 
         Avg_Some_College Avg_Bachelors Avg_Masters_Plus Avg_LogIncome 
      Avg_Low_education Avg_Medium_Education Avg_High_Education; 
   run; 
  
data IPUMS.FINAL; 
   merge work.control work.pctmerge IPUMS.Intermediate; 
   by indocc; 
   if ind1990 = . then delete; 
   if occ1990 = . then delete; 
   if pct_software = . then delete; 
   if DHSpctchange = . then delete; 
   if task_offshorability = . then delete; 
   if female = . then delete; 
   if African_American = . then delete; 
   if Other_Race = . then delete;  
   if Age = . then delete; 
   if Medium_Education = . then delete; 
   if High_Education = . then delete; 
   if LogIncome = . then delete; 
   DHS= DHSpctchange*(100); 
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   run; 
proc contents; 
   run; 
ods pdf; 
proc reg; 
   model DHS = pct_software; 
   run; 
proc reg; 
   model DHS = pct_software task_offshorability Avg_Female 
Avg_African_American Avg_Other_Race Avg_age 
 Avg_Medium_Education Avg_High_Education Avg_LogIncome; 
   run; 
proc reg; 
   model DHS = pct_software task_offshorability Avg_Medium_Education 
Avg_High_Education Avg_LogIncome; 
   run; 
proc sort; 
   by ind1990 occ1990; 
   run; 
proc panel data = IPUMS.Final; 
   title "Fixed Effects Model 1"; 
   id ind1990 occ1990; 
   model DHS = pct_software task_offshorability Avg_Medium_Education 
Avg_High_Education Avg_LogIncome / FIXONE; 
   run; 
proc panel data = IPUMS.Final; 
   title "Fixed Effects Model 2"; 
   id ind1990 occ1990; 
   model DHS =  pct_software task_offshorability Avg_Female 
Avg_African_American Avg_Other_Race Avg_age Avg_Medium_Education 
Avg_High_Education Avg_LogIncome / FIXONE; 
   run; 
ods pdf close; 
proc means data = IPUMS.Final; 
   run; 
  
proc corr data = IPUMS.Final; 
   var DHS pct_software pct_ai task_offshorability Avg_Female 
Avg_African_American Avg_Other_Race Avg_age Avg_Medium_Education 
Avg_High_Education Avg_LogIncome; 
   with DHS pct_software pct_ai task_offshorability; 
   run; 
